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Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz Verdict 
[A review article on Joseph Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents, Norton & Co., 
New York, 2002.] 
 
1.  Introduction 
  Joseph Stiglitz's recent book, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) defies 
easy categorization.  It is, in part, an academic monograph meant to be read by 
professional economists and the serious graduate student; but it is also, in part, a diatribe 
against the injustices of global finance and politics. It is written at times from the ivory 
tower, contemplating the vast panorama of international economic relations with a 
researcher's trained but distant vision; but it also reads in places like a rabble-rousing call 
from an activist who has no time for the niceties of models and regressions. With a title 
that rhymes with Sigmund Freud's classic monograph, this too is a book where an 
academic, who has done pioneering work in his field, cuts loose from the binds of his 
discipline and assesses the world with passion, concern and also disappointment.   
  It is the disappointment that makes this such a compelling book.  Stiglitz has seen 
it all.  In 1993 he moved out of the groves of academe to join President Clinton's Council 
of Economic Advisers
1.  From there he went to the World Bank as Senior Vice President 
and Chief Economist.  Popular globally for championing the cause of the disadvantaged 
and dispossessed and for not holding back on criticizing the U.S. Department of Treasury 
and the IMF, he became unpopular in the bastions of power in Washington for the very 
same reasons.  Soon after leaving the World Bank and joining Columbia University he 
won the Nobel Prize in economics, shared with George Akerlof and Michael Spence.  He 
                                                 
1 Initially, as Member, and then, from 1995 to 1997, as Chairman.   3
himself has little to be disappointed about in the world.  And that is exactly what gives 
poignancy and moral force to his disappointment, and strength to his argument. 
  Moving from the world of theoretical models and the study of market equilibria, 
he encountered in Washington a world of finance and markets, which did not correspond 
to the theoretical constructs of modern economics.  This was true even when one 
considered the most realistic theoretical models, which broke ranks with the orthodoxy of 
the so-called traditional 'Chicago School' and allowed for imperfect information, multiple 
equilibria and Pareto sub-optimality. Moreover, not only was reality less perfect than 
these models, it was more unfair. Of course, the unfairness works to the advantage of the 
strong and the powerful and the ones who side with the establishment.  This book is 
Stiglitz's breaking rank with the establishment. 
  There are many 'outsiders' who have written critiques of globalization and the 
global financial system.  Insiders typically do not do so; they have too much to lose.  It is 
this recklessness that makes the book effective. This is so in the same way that Soros' 
(2002) critique of U.S. hegemony and the unfairness of market fundamentalism makes 
compelling reading because his recommendations stand at variance from his interests. 
  Another strength of the book stems from the fact of Stiglitz’s command over the 
length and breadth of economics.  So, while he lashes out at market fundamentalism, he 
is fully aware of and never down plays the importance of markets and incentives.  
Likewise, while he points to all the negative fall-outs of globalization and how it has 
marginalized so many people, communities and nations, he shows awareness of the ways 
in which globalization can confer benefits on the poor. In fact, he makes it clear that he is 
no anti-globalizer.  He is fully cognizant of the benefits of trade and global capital flows.   4
This is a book that can be read profitably by both the defenders of market 
fundamentalism and the demurrers of globalization.  
  Despite all these strengths, the book fails to live up to its expectations in some 
important dimensions.  Some of these have to do with the minor nuts and bolts of 
Stiglitz's argument – I shall comment on those when I come upon them.  A more major 
disappointment stems from the fact that, while the book breaks away from so many 
orthodoxies and builds up expectation for a new alternative vision, it does not attempt to 
deliver on that.   
Barring a few readers, steeped in prejudice, most will agree with the broad 
contours of Stiglitz’s criticism of global politics and orthodox economics. But in the 
wake of this criticism the natural question that arises is: how then should one think of 
markets and economies, and what should be the paradigm that one carries in one’s head 
when thinking of global political economy?  With a lesser author one would be wrong to 
even ask these questions. It should be deemed enough if the author managed to raise 
doubts about the orthodoxy. But given that Joseph Stiglitz has in the past dislodged parts 
of orthodox economics and rebuilt new models in their place, one naturally hoped for a 
little bit of the latter in this book; but on that score one is left disappointed. 
 
2.  Facts, Theories and Myths 
  In many dimensions modern economics has had phenomenal success.  On a 
variety of subject matters there are excellent models – theoretical constructs that help us 
think through what the consequences of certain actions will be.  Thus, if following the 
Iraq War, oil supplies to the world increase, we know that the price of travel will fall.    5
We do not need empirical knowledge of previous experience with the rise and fall of 
Iraqi oil supplies to make this prediction.  We make the prediction using the model of 
demand and supply, which is founded on a few basic ‘truths’ (which are admittedly 
empirical), and then applying a chain of deductive reasoning based on that. 
  There are other areas, where we have little or no theory to go by, but have enough 
evidence to make intelligent guesses about how one action may affect another.  
But despite the much-vaunted success of economics in many areas, economics 
remains remarkably weak on some of the most important questions that confront nations.  
What causes an economic crisis, such as the one that affected most of East Asia in 1997?  
And what is the remedy when such a crisis occurs? How does politics intertwine with 
markets? What kind of political system helps economic growth and what kind hinders? 
If we search through the textbooks of economics and the tomes of data at our 
disposal, we will be forced to admit that we have very little to go by when taking on such 
questions. But we are, nevertheless, often forced to give answers. An international 
organization, such as the IMF or the World Bank, whose job it is to help nations in 
economic trouble, cannot keep quiet when such troubling questions are asked.  So they 
give answers, and through a process of herd behavior, the answers converged to what 
seemed like a consensus.  Nations must privatize, cut fiscal deficit, curtail subsidies, 
remove trade barriers, and allow the free flow of international capital.  This broad 
package came to be known as the 'Washington Consensus'.
2 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the Consensus and Stiglitz’s position on this see Chang (2001).   6
It will be unwise to think of the Washington Consensus as a product of 
conspiracy
3.  It emerged from serious economists searching for the 'best practices' in an 
uncertain world, international organizations shirking from having to say "We do not 
know" and other unintentional acts.  But, at the same time, it survives because it fits well 
with vested interests; it does not upset the apple cart. 
The etymology of the term ‘Washington Consensus’ is interesting. What has 
come to be known by that term today is a bit of a caricature of the original. The term was, 
probably, first used by John Williamson in 1989 to describe a policy agenda, specifically, 
for Latin America. As he points out in a lucid, recent essay (Williamson, 2003), he was 
aware, even then, that the agenda omitted important objectives, such as a concern for 
better income distribution. His aim, at that stage, was to sketch a minimal agenda that 
would be acceptable to Washington. It was never meant to be a complete policy 
manifesto for all countries, or even all developing countries. But, over the years, it got 
seized upon by politicians and bureaucrats wanting to push a particular policy manifesto, 
and in the popular mind Washington Consensus came to be associated with this. 
However, given that the Washington Consensus is not a formal document or an 
agreement, it is right to treat it now as what people take it to be. Hence, Stiglitz is right to 
direct his critique of this caricatured version of the Consensus rather than the original.   
  Stiglitz lived in Washington during the years of the East Asian and Russian crises 
of the nineties, and the heydays of transition in former socialist economies.  And he grew 
                                                 
3 Conspiracy theories are troublesome. Many lay persons see more conspiracies than there are, if only 
because human beings are congenitally prone to believing that someone’s volition must be involved 
whenever they see order. In reality, Krugman (1998) is right when he asserts that he is disinclined to 
believe in conspiracy theories because, from what he had seen of world leaders, “they seem a lot like the 
rest of us: Most of the time they haven’t got a clue”. On the other hand, we must not be so naïve as to treat 
all order as spontaneous order. As Krugman observes in the same article, “Yet conspiracies do happen.”   7
disillusioned with the Washington Consensus.  As he pushed hard to modify it, he 
realized that what gradually emerged as the Consensus may have been a product of 
serious soul searching, but interests had developed around it and in it.  Much of this book 
is about the discovery of how myths get etched into institutional consciousness as facts 
and are then defended by established interests.  
  The easy way to defend a disputed idea is not to open it up for debate and to keep 
one’s true findings and doubts in the closet.  So a natural concomitant of this is a lack of 
transparency.  And Stiglitz is right to argue that, over the years, the IMF has come to 
have too little transparency. On some matters he takes too strong a position against the 
IMF, as we shall see when we come to a discussion of the East Asian crisis.   
 
3.  East Asian and Russian Crises 
  The book has a large thesis: Globalization can potentially benefit all, but it has not 
done so.  Those who are at the helm of global politics and economics have made sure that 
their wealth gets amassed and their power is protected.  This has worked to the detriment 
of masses of people and regions that have got marginalized.  The micro markets for 
wheat and rice may work entirely according to the laws of demand and supply, but the 
larger facts of economic life respond as much to politics and power as demand and 
supply, thereby casting doubts on our textbook theorems of market efficiency and 
optimality. 
  Stiglitz treats the East Asian and Russian crises of the late nineties as case studies 
in support of his thesis.  On July 2, 1997, the Thai baht, after trading for ten years around 
25 to a dollar, depreciated overnight by 25%.  No one knew at that time that this was the   8
start of one of the greatest economic crises since the Great Depression.  The crisis would 
soon spread to Malaysia, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia.  Over the next several 
months, these currencies would continue on a free fall, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Devaluations and Share Price Collapse, July 1, 1997 to February 16, 1998 
  % Depreciation of Currency 
vis-à-vis the dollar 
% change in the share 
price index 
Thailand  09 87⋅   - 48.37 
Malaysia  43 55⋅   - 58.41 
Korea  04 83⋅   - 63.06 
Philippines  37 51⋅   - 49.17 
Indonesia  00 231⋅   - 81.74 
 
Source:  Bloomberg Financial Services L.P., and Bank of Mexico. Reproduced in 
Martinez (1998). 
 
  The start of the crisis may have been inevitable but for its persistence, depth and 
consequent human suffering Stiglitz places the blame directly on the IMF and he does so 
with no holds barred. The problem, according to Stiglitz began early, when the "IMF and 
the U.S. Treasury seemed to criticize the countries – according to the IMF, the Asian 
nations' institutions were rotten, their governments corrupt, and wholesale reform was 
needed"(Stiglitz, 2002, p. 90). 
  There were many commentators who criticized the IMF for having failed to 
predict such a major crisis.  Indeed there seemed to have been no one who predicted this.  
I had, some way into the crisis, researched through several weeks of old issues of the 
Economist and other magazines preceding the crisis.  There were indeed no forewarnings;   9
the Thai baht's fundamentals were described repeatedly as robust.  The only mild 
criticism for East Asia was for its banking system and burgeoning non-performing assets.  
But failure to predict the crisis cannot be reason for criticism. It is, in fact, arguable that 
there is a logical problem in there existing anyone who is known to be able to predict a 
currency collapse in advance.  It is not that no one can know well in advance that a 
currency will collapse.  It is simply that no one can be known to know that.   
To see this, suppose that there is an institution or a person who, through research 
or intuition, gets to know a month in advance when a currency is going to collapse.  If 
now he is known to have this forecasting power, every time he makes such a forecast 
speculators will immediately sell the currency that he predicts will collapse after a month.  
That will cause the currency to collapse immediately.  So he will never be able to make a 
public forecast of a collapse well in advance.   
  Stiglitz is too clear-headed a thinker not to realize this and he never criticizes the 
IMF for its failure to predict the crisis
4. His criticism is directed at IMF's assertion, in 
retrospect, that it knew this had to happen some time because these East Asian nations 
were managing their economies so poorly, and the fact that the IMF then moved rapidly 
to put in place its standard reform package rooted in the Washington Consensus: These 
economies would have to raise interest rates, cut deficits, stabilize their economy and 
privatize. 
  This policy prescription, according to Stiglitz, exacerbated the problem.  The 
IMF’s big mistake was its failure to realize that the East Asian crisis was different from 
                                                 
4 The IMF’s failure to sound a warning on Korea, after Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia went into crisis 
was, however, disappointing. Blustein (2001, p.118) has quoted from a confidential IMF document, dated 
as late as October 15, 1997, which observed that Korea’s fundamentals were so strong that “we have   10
crises seen in other parts of the world; and also that the global economic situation had 
changed quite drastically since the big international debt crisis of Latin America in 1982.  
Michael Camdessus was right in a sense when he described the East Asian crisis as the 
first financial crisis of the twenty-first century.  But the response of the organization he 
headed did not reflect a proper understanding of this. 
  There were indeed, several important dimensions in which the world economy 
had changed.  The most important is economic globalization.  It is true that the world has 
been globalizing, in the sense of becoming more connected, ever since the dawn of 
human history.  When the first humans moved out of Africa, when Amerigo Vespucci 
landed in the New World more than 500 years ago, and when Vasco da Gama landed in 
Cochin around the same time, these were all steps towards globalization.  But there can 
be no denial that after a brief retreat between the two World Wars, the pace of 
globalization gathered pace like never before.  This is true on two particular dimensions, 
capital movement, and trade.  This is captured well in Table 2A and 2B. 
Trade has increased very sharply in all major regions of the world, no matter how 
one measures this – in absolute terms or as percentage of GDP.  If one goes further back 
into history one finds that in the entire hundred years from 1500 to 1600, there were 770 
ships that sailed from Europe to the rest of the world (Madison, 2001, p. 63)
5.  Given that 
barring a trickle over land there were in those times no other mode of trade, it is evident 
                                                                                                                                                 
confidence in the authorities’ ability to prudently manage the situation”. The report was, subsequently, 
quietly put away in the Fund’s files.  
5 Actually, this figure that Madison quotes is of ships that sailed from the 7 most major European countries. 
But given that there were no other serious maritime nations at that time, this would be pretty much the bulk 
of total transcontinental ship travel in the world. In addition, interestingly, of these 770 ships, 705 were 
from Portugal alone.   11
that in terms of the sheer flow of goods, services and electronic material, the world has 
come a very long way. 
Table 2A.  Merchandise Export as % of GDP 
 
  1870 1913 1950 1995 
Western Europe 
 
8.8 14.1 8.7 35.8 
Asia 
 
1.7 3.4 4.2  12.6 
Latin America 
 
9.7 9.0 6.0 9.7 
Africa 
 
5.8 20.0  15.1  14.8 
World 
 
4.6 7.9 5.5  17.2 
 
 
Table 2B. Value of Foreign Capital Stock in Developing Countries ($ billion and %) 
 
 1870  1914  1950  1998 
Total (in 1990 prices) 
 
40.1 235.4 63.2  3,030.7 
Stock as % of GDP 
 
8.6 32.4 4.4 21.7 
 
Source: Madison (2001) 
 
  Regarding capital flows, as a percentage of GDP there has not been a monotonic 
rise.  But the absolute amount of capital flow has risen dramatically.  In addition, it has to 
be kept in mind that in colonial times, while capital did move from one nation to another, 
typically, capital flows had to be preceded by the flow of army, which would take 
political control of the colony to which the capital was being directed. The capital of the 
last two or three decades, on the other, is much more footloose, flowing in and out of 
countries over which the sender of capital may have no political control.  Also, important   12
to note in this context is the fact that a lot of the international capital was flowing into the 
stock markets of East Asia.  
  Another major difference between East Asia of the nineties and other regions and 
even East Asia of some decades ago, is their high savings rate: All the East Asian 
economies save over 30% of their national income.  Under these circumstances there was 
no need for full capital account liberalization.  This, according to Stiglitz, was "the single 
most important factor leading to the crisis" (p. 99). Many economists such as Jagdish 
Bhagwati, who, on trade matters, take a complete free market position, nevertheless take 
a line on capital account liberalization which is similar to that of Stiglitz
6.  Ironically, 
even as I write, the Washington administration is once again pushing for the abolition of 
capital controls
7, unmindful of the warning by many economists that trade in goods must 
not be equated with capital flows (see Bhagwati and Tarullo, 2003, Wan, 2003).
8
  Whatever was the precise cause of the crisis, Stiglitz argues that the failure to 
appreciate the new reality and the use of the old standard IMF package backfired in East 
Asia. It is a theoretically elegant analysis that Stiglitz puts forward in his book. 
  A standard policy response to crisis that had been used time and again in Latin 
America consisted of controlling excess demand (by, for instance, cutting government 
                                                 
6 A more disaggregated analysis would emphasize that the problem is not with the overall volume of capital 
flows but with its composition. A study by Rodrik and Velasco (1999) shows that a country with short-term 
liability to foreign banks that exceed its foreign reserves is three times as likely to have a sudden outflow of 
capital.  
7 This is part of the free trade agreements being negotiated by the U.S. with Chile and Singapore. What 
these countries wanted was not capital controls but the freedom to use capital controls in certain 
contingencies. But in the end they relented under pressure from the U.S. negotiators. 
8 For one, the capital market (unlike the market for goods) seldom takes the form in which an agent can 
borrow as much as she wishes at the going interest rate. Moreover, a person demanding capital is, typically, 
asked by the lender to explain why she needs the money. The greengrocer, on the other hand, does not ask 
you why you want the oranges before he agrees to sell you some.       13
expenditure) and raising interest rate.  Both these policies, Stiglitz argues, were wrong for 
East Asia, and were prompted by a crucial misdiagnosis of the crisis. 
  As an aside, it is worth noting that for this same reason, Stiglitz’s brief analysis of 
Argentina is less convincing. It is not clear that the contractionary policy recommended 
by the IMF to Argentina was wrong. Argentina’s government, struggling to compete with 
Brazil, with its exchange rate policy frozen under a Currency Board, was in a bind. 
Moreover, in the late nineties, it repeatedly missed its tax revenue targets, which made 
expenditure cutbacks that much more necessary. 
  Controlling excess demand is right policy for a nation suffering from inflation or 
repressed inflation.  In East Asia there were no inflationary pressures in 1997 and the 
economies had reasonable macro-balance, including low fiscal deficits.  Under those 
circumstances cutting government expenditure was likely to exacerbate a recession 
instead of aiding in its abatement. 
  The second policy instrument--that of raising the interest rate--is often used to 
bring foreign currency into the country (lured by the high interest rate) and thereby stall 
exchange rate depreciation.  In East Asia this policy backfired for an interesting reason.  
While the governments of these countries had balanced budgets, the corporate sector, 
including small firms, was heavily indebted.  When interest rates were suddenly raised in 
Thailand (and the same policy pattern would follow elsewhere) this may have 
temporarily shored up the demand for bahts but it meant that the highly leveraged Thai 
firms were driven to bankruptcy.
9 
                                                 
9 This argument of Stiglitz finds support from a detailed computable general equilibrium model of 
Indonesia that has been developed by Azis, Azis and Thorbecke (2001). By running simulations with 
alternative policy interventions, in particular, one where the intervention deviated from the actual IMF one 
by holding interest rate at a lower level, the authors found evidence that the IMF policy did exacerbate   14
  Much has been written about 'contagion' and 'infection' in discussing economic 
crisis and the often-mysterious process by which a crisis transmits from one country to 
another.  Another important product of globalization that has not been written about 
adequately is what may be described as 'market contamination', namely, the process by 
which a crisis in one market or sector transmits to another.  Market contamination is a 
product of the kind of globalization described above. 
  To continue with the Thailand example, note that as companies began to go 
bankrupt the stock prices, naturally, started to fall.  This meant that people began selling 
off their stocks.  In earlier times when currencies did not flow across borders with 
alacrity, this crisis could remain contained.  But nowadays with such large capital flows 
across nations it is reasonable to expect that a part of the stocks traded on the Bangkok 
stock exchange will be by foreigners.  It follows that with stock prices collapsing, as 
people sell off stocks, some of those selling the stocks will be foreigners (non Thailand 
residents).  Since these people would typically have converted their currencies (dollars, 
euros, yens…) into Thai bahts, originally, in order to buy stocks in Bangkok, when they 
sell their stocks and collect bahts it is natural to expect they will convert the bahts back to 
their own currency.  Hence, a fall in stock prices would now have a direct impact on the 
foreign exchange market causing the baht to devalue.  Once the foreign exchange market 
gets destabilized, this will tend to rapidly contaminate other markets
10. 
                                                                                                                                                 
some of the suffering. It is worth noting here that a recent theoretical exercise by Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee (2001) puts the credit shortages faced by private firms, instead of macro imbalances at the level of 
government, at the center of the model in explaining currency crises. In this sense, it is close to Stiglitz’s 
description of the East Asian crisis. However, they find that, typically, raising the interest rate may be the 
right policy and one that can stall a crisis.     
10 The contamination of one market by another is illustrated well in Table 1. In each of the East Asian crisis 
country, at least in the early stages, the collapse of the currency was matched by the collapse of share 
prices. In many of these nations, land and property prices also collapsed around the same time.    15
  To return to the epidemiological analogy and to steal a macabre insight from the 
SARS epidemic, note that some markets are more effective at spreading trouble than 
others.  Just as there was Typhoid Mary in 1907, and some people have been identified as 
'super-infectors' in the spread of SARS, some markets are better than others at spreading 
contamination.  Clearly the foreign exchange market is a 'super-infector' since it underlies 
so many other activities.  This is especially so given globalization.  To understand this, 
note that, if the baht is expected to fall, foreigners, who had bought stocks in Thailand or 
property in Thailand and measure their profit in dollars will have some reason to sell off 
their stocks (even though stock prices are not expected to fall) and then of course they 
will sell off the bahts thus acquired.  Likewise for property.  Hence, now stock prices and 
property prices will begin to collapse though nothing had happened in the stock market or 
the housing market to warrant this. 
  This is what happened in East Asia.  The contamination traveled from one market 
to another and the echoes returned to worsen the initial crisis. And soon the contagion 
caught on in other countries. 
  One problem with Stiglitz’s analysis of the East Asian crisis is that he gives too 
little benefit of doubt to the IMF. While he is right to be heavily critical of IMF 
conditionalities, its lack of transparency and its lack of adequate concern for poverty
11, 
one is left wondering how the IMF could have been so systematically on the wrong side 
on so many decisions. And Stiglitz is ambiguous on an important question that naturally 
                                                 
11 In fact one of the beneficial by-products of Stiglitz’s hard-hitting criticism of the IMF is that it has now 
instituted programs to monitor the consequences of IMF stabilization programs for the poor. I have argued 
in Basu (2001) that international organizations should move towards evaluating nations in terms of the 
performance of their poorest 20% of the population. Apart from the fact that such a measure has some 
attractive technical properties, it should over time help tilt our aims in favor of the most disadvantaged.   16
arises from his analysis: Were the IMF’s mistakes instances of malfeasance or just 
bumbling? 
  In places he suggests that the IMF represented Wall Street’s interests mediated 
through the Treasury, even when it was working ostensibly to help poor nations. “While 
Wall Streeters defended the principles of free markets and a limited role of government, 
they were not above asking help from government to push their agenda for them. And we 
shall see, the Treasury Department responded with force” (p.102). And the US with over 
17% of the votes in the IMF worked hard to “help the special interests of Wall Street”.  
  But there are other times when he seems to say it was not a case of malfeasance 
but ignorance on the part of the IMF. “Only if they had better economists”, he seems to 
be suggesting. But if the IMF were representing special interests, having better 
economists would not make them more receptive to the concerns of developing countries 
but simply more effective in serving the special interests
12.  
  I believe that in subtle ways the big powers do take control of the major 
international organizations and defend certain policies and ideas that are convenient to 
them. But they do this, often, not by directly twisting the agenda, but settling into an 
ideology and promoting ideas that are compatible with their interests. This is not hard 
because, as we discussed above, economics has had some major successes but remains 
woefully inadequate on many of the most important questions that confront 
policymakers. In these latter areas, it is easy for myths to develop. By repeating certain 
propositions sufficiently often they can be made to sound like facts and, given the 
                                                 
12 Hence, the question, “Why did the best and the brightest fail?”, does not seem to me to be a particularly 
interesting.  They may not have been trying to do what we thought they were trying to do. Also, the best 
and the brightest can be locked in games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma among themselves, and so may end 
up doing badly even for themselves.    17
credibility of economics in other areas, most people treat as facts. This creates scope for 
subversion, feeding people with 'facts' which are convenient to some. The British satirical 
magazine, Private Eye, responding to the obsession of some American magazines to 
repeat-check facts, had once asserted how they, on the other hand, ran on the principle 
that "some facts are too good to be checked"
13. The powerful do precisely that. The 
critical eye is turned away from myths, which are convenient to influential groups and 
powerful nations--Stiglitz’s “Wall Streeters”, big corporations and well-organized 
lobbies—, and in the process they get perpetuated.  
The fact that economics has no real hard answers to the questions that countries 
face during a crisis, makes it possible for the IMF to behave the way it does. But this also 
means that the sort of policies that the IMF propounds is not egregiously or obviously 
false (see footnote 6). The IMF’s fault is not that it recommended what is known to be 
false, but that it recommended in a tone of certainty on matters on which existing expert 
opinion is divided.  
  On balance, I do feel persuaded by Stiglitz that the IMF recommendations were 
flawed in East Asia; but the impossibility of doing a counter-factual experiment will 
mean that this will remain an open question. The IMF has maintained that the East Asian 
crisis was short-lived because of its policies. On the other hand, Stiglitz and other critics 
of the IMF have argued that the crisis was so deep because of IMF policies. The state of 
our current knowledge of economics is such that a full resolution of this is not possible. 
In the case of some of the bigger countries the IMF has actually, unwittingly, 
played a useful role. When India had its economic crisis and had to turn to the IMF for 
                                                 
13 Quoted from Sarah Lyall’s essay, ‘Recipe for Roasting the Sacred Cow, Tastelessly’, New York Times, 
November 12, 2001.    18
support in 1991, the Indian government managed to use the alibi of IMF pressure to push 
in some essential reforms
14 which otherwise may not have been possible because of 
political constraints. 
Also the IMF is probably less of a monolith than what Stiglitz seems to suggest. 
Thus he talks of “the IMF had feared”, “the IMF felt”, “the IMF opposed”. But there are, 
invariably, many opinions within such a large organization. I had witnessed this during 
my one year in the World Bank, in 1998-99. On a variety of matters (certainly on child 
labor) the research going on in the Bank was of a high quality and the opinions being 
expressed in many of these works were at variance with what the higher echelons of the 
Bank did or said, thereby showing that on many of these matters to talk of “the World 
Bank’s view” would not make much sense
15.  
Stiglitz is on stronger ground on Russia because here he dwells a lot on cases 
where there were problems of corruption and attempts by the business mafia to twist 
policy to their own benefit. The crisis that hit Russia in the late nineties was quite 
dramatic. During 1940 to 1946 in Soviet Russia industrial production fell by 24%. In 
1990 to 1999 industrial production fell by 60% and GDP fell by 54%.  As Stiglitz noted, 
“For the majority of those living in the former Soviet Union, economic life under 
capitalism has been even worse than the old Communist leaders had said it would be” 
(p.133). 
                                                 
14 In fact much of the Indian reforms would be broadly in keeping with what Stiglitz would recommend. 
15 This also reveals that smart institutions have a way of dealing with a variety of opinions within the 
organization without silencing them and, at the same time, not allowing them to interfere with what the 
institution does. When I was a kid, growing up in Calcutta, and an unwanted kid came along and tried to 
join us, we would whisper into one another’s ears the words “ele bele”. An ele bele, in colloquial Bengali, 
is a person who thinks he is participating, but is not taken seriously by the real participants. It seems to me 
now that that was useful training since so many reputedly democratic organizations manage to maintain 
that reputation only by making its grassroots participants believe that they are participating.     19
In Russia the tragedy was that Communism gave way into the hands of venal and 
corrupt profiteers. The new owners of formerly state-owned enterprises looted the 
companies, literally selling off company assets to stash away the loot in their private 
accounts. Some of the privatization programs were run very badly, and surely the IMF 
knew better. As Stiglitz observed, “It is easy to privatize quickly if one does not pay any 
attention to how one privatizes: essentially give away valuable state property to one’s 
friends” (p. 144). 
The immediate benefit of privatization is to increase efficiency and there is 
evidence that this does usually happen
16. There is however a quandary about how firms 
are privatized that has to be kept in mind. If the state-owned firms are sold off at cut 
prices, as happened in Russia, basically one is making a gift to the buyer. Since such a 
gift is not always visible to the lay public, this gives rise to corruption, with politicians 
effecting quid pro quo trades with business people. On the other hand, if the state-owned 
firms are sold at their full market price, then this act of privatization, in itself, does not 
amount to a transfer of wealth from government. It merely amounts to a re-composition 
of government portfolio. In that case, much depends on what is done with the money that 
is acquired by government after the sale. If the government uses it to acquire control over 
some other resource, which it is not good at managing, then this privatization need not 
yield any benefit.  
Since the purpose of privatization is to diminish government control over ordinary 
market activity, one essential feature of successful privatization is the transfer of 
resources back to the public. The rub with the Russian privatization was not that   20
individuals gained from it (that they would have to for the privatization to be considered 
successful) but the way it was done and the disregard for equity and fairness associated 
with the distribution of the spoils. Also, given the institutional setting in which this 
occurred, the incentives of the new owners were not to run the firm efficiently, but to 
strip it of its assets. 
Stiglitz is right to lay a large part of this blame at the doorstep of the international 
financial community, which with its larger experience and knowledge base could have 
avoided the rampant corruption. His description of the loans-for-share scandal is quite 
chilling. Government took loans from private banks with shares of publicly owned firms 
as collateral. It then went on to default on these loans and the ownership of public firms 
had been smoothly transferred over to friendly bank entrepreneurs. 
The finer details of the reform package would not have been so important if it 
were not for the toll it took on ordinary human beings. In 1989, 2% of those living in 
Russia were below the poverty line, defined by consumption being less than 2-dollars a 
day. By 1989 the figure had risen to 23.8%, and 50% of the children were living in 
households below the poverty line (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 153).    
The story was similar in East Asia. Unemployment rose very sharply within a 
year—it nearly trebled in Korea; and real wages fell dramatically in Indonesia (by 41%) 
but also sharply enough in Korea (9.3%) and Thailand (7.4%). This information is 
summarized in Table 3 below. 
  We know that in the case of Indonesia this has also led to political instability and 
violence. For a poor nation, such a sharp downturn has to be quite traumatic. 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 For a survey, see Megginson and Netter (2001).  It is however worth mentioning that if the privatization 
occurs in an environment where there is no appropriate anti-trust legislation, then the privatization can   21
 
Table 3 
Real Wage and Unemployment Changes in East Asia 
  % Change in Real  
Wage During 1998 
 
Unemployment 
   1997  1998 
Indonesia  0 41⋅ −   7 4⋅   4 5⋅  
Korea  3 9⋅ −   6 2⋅   8 6⋅  
Malaysia  1 1⋅ −   6 2⋅   0 4⋅  
Philippines  0 2⋅ −   7 8⋅   1 10⋅  
Thailand  4 7⋅ −   2 2⋅   2 5⋅  
 
Source:  Betcherman and Islam, 2001. 
 
  Stiglitz goes on to lament how little the richer nations and power blocks did to 
assuage the problems, even if we are willing to spare them responsibility for having 
caused some of the problems. A point that he makes poignantly and more than once is 
how warped our global policies are that we are willing to spend billions on bailouts, 
which were often bailouts more for Western banks than for the nations in trouble, 
whereas, when it came to the few millions of dollars needed to mitigate the degradation 
and poverty that the crises caused, there was never enough money.
17 This leads to some 
large questions of global politics and the way globalization has changed the world. The 
last chapters of the book take Stiglitz to this large terrain. These are extremely valuable 
chapters, which no one can afford to ignore. But, at the same time, this is where one is 
                                                                                                                                                 
aggravate certain kinds of inefficiencies (Bhaskar and Khan, 1995). 
17 The one concrete plan that he puts forward for this involves the use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to 
create global public goods and to help the poor. This is somewhat similar to Soros’s (2002) suggestion to   22
left regretting that he does not take his power of abstraction and formalization further to 
organize his thoughts and give us a more complete paradigm of global political economy. 
  Take, for instance, Stiglitz’s criticism of the IMF. Surely, all the faults that he 
points to cannot be idiosyncratic to the IMF. If that were so, then we would have to 
simply treat it as an anomaly of nature that this organization is so pernicious. Our 
prescription would then have to be to excise it or alter its management totally. But that is 
not what Stiglitz means, since his occasional reference to the U. S. Treasury, The World 
Bank and the Wall Streeters, shows that the same malaise as the one that afflicts the IMF 
is widely prevalent. Big powerful organizations all seem to behave in a similar fashion. 
Hence, the IMF is more a likely a product of the ‘system’ or the ‘rules’ of the game by 
which the global economy runs. Even if the IMF were replaced by a JNG, as long as it 
functioned in the same global ethos, it would, over time, begin to behave much the same 
way. My suspicion is that Stiglitz will agree with this analysis
18. If that be so, the critique 
needs to be directed much more at the rules of the global game, than at specific players in 
this game. Policy-wise this is a very hard question. Since we understand so poorly where 
the fundamental rules of the game of life come from, it is not obvious to anybody how we 
should go about changing those rules. But given that much of Stiglitz’s book builds up to 
this engaging question, it would have been nice if we could be privy to Stiglitz’s thoughts 
on the matter, however embryonic. I hope that there is another book in the offing.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rich nations to donate their SDR allocations for international assistance to poor nations. But Stiglitz’s 
strategy is really not spelled out enough for us to be able to evaluate it carefully.   23
4. Globalization, Politics and Democracy 
One reason why our understanding of global political economy is so weak is 
because of the way mainstream economics used to be written. Much of it presumed 
markets to be competitive, information perfect, and human beings fully rational, and 
there is no room for power politics. Though modern economics has moved far away from 
that model, especially in terms of recognizing the importance of oligopolies and 
asymmetries of information
19, a large number of policymakers remain under the spell of 
the traditional model. That model may be a reasonable approximation of some simple 
intra-country markets. But as soon as we enter the global market place, with no over-
arching system of law and government, we leave the textbook models (even the modern 
ones, which though rich in other ways is yet to properly characterize the role of power 
politics in the functioning of economies) behind and looking inadequate. Hence, as is 
amply clear from this book, there is need to go beyond textbook models—even the 
modern ones--to a deeper critique and a more fundamental reconstruction of economics 
that is embedded in sociology and politics. 
Let me illustrate this with the far-reaching implication of one assumption that is 
patently wrong but that most mainstream economics treats as true. This is the assumption 
of individual rationality.
20  
One major way in which contemporary human beings are better off than humans 
of an earlier era is that they do not, typically, have to rely on physical strength to guard 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 As he observes in another paper (Stiglitz, 2003), given IMF’s mandate and its consequent close 
connection with various finance ministries and financial communities, it would be surprising to find it 
behave differently from the way it actually does. 
19Some of these market failures have been written about effectively by Stiglitz himself in his earlier 
incarnation as an economic theorist.  For a comprehensive review of the ways in which market failures 
occur in developing countries see Hoff and Stiglitz (2001). 
20 Admittedly the new behavioral economics has at last begun to chip away at this assumption.   24
their own interest
21. When we walk down a road wearing a nice watch, we do not have to 
be prepared to fight to keep it. On returning home from an outing we do not expect to 
have to throw out people occupying our home. This is because of a general recognition 
that it is wrong of one person to grab another’s belongings just because one is able to, and 
the consequent policing and social norms that have merged around this recognition.  
In primitive times, those who were physically weak must have been reconciled to 
the fact that the strong would take away much of what was theirs. There may even have 
been those who argued that that is the way things ought to be.  It is a huge achievement in 
making the world just and fair that this happens no more (at least in most regions).  
Note, however, that we do not have an equivalent moral code against one person 
becoming richer than another by out-witting the latter. Outwitting seems to be fair game. 
When a rural moneylender becomes rich by repeatedly cutting good deals vis-à-vis the 
borrower, when a colonizer buys up valuable property from savages, or when a financier 
extends a home-improvement loan to an old lady living alone in Washington, knowing 
that the odds are that she will not be able to repay the loan and he will be able to 
foreclose on her property, we consider these deals acceptable, as long as there is no 
strong-arm tactic used. If both sides agree freely to a deal, why should anybody else 
interfere? 
What we do not pause to think in these examples is that, maybe, one side is 
actually miscalculating. Maybe the rural borrower is indulging in hyperbolic discounting 
and so being dynamically inconsistent, that the savages are being irrational and 
misjudging the future worth of the property and the old lady, in her eagerness to repaint 
                                                 
21 This is not to deny that there are regions of the world, where the hand of law is so weak that they 
resemble primitive times.     25
her home, is being over-optimistic about her capacity to repay the loan. One reason why 
we have so few safeguards against people cutting irrational deals is because the 
economists’ assumption that all human beings are rational has seeped into our everyday 
thinking. If no one is irrational, there can be no need to protect the irrational. Deals that 
look lop-sided must merely reflect differences in preferences.  
But now that behavioral economics is beginning to open our eyes, we realize that, 
may be, some people who are impoverished are so because they cut poor deals over and 
over again, just as some village lenders are rich because they systematically cut ‘good’ 
deals. Likewise there is now recognition that the lady in Washington who gets lured into 
that attractive loan may be a victim of ‘predatory lending’. It is in fact interesting to note 
that the Federal Trade Commission in Washington now recognizes predatory lending as a 
problem that needs to be dealt with.
22   
The failure to recognize that outwitting an intellectually weaker person of her 
wealth may be wrong in the same way that physically unburdening a person of her 
belongings has had far-reaching consequences, especially in global contexts. First of all, 
this has meant a lot of unfairness in contracts and, secondly, being aware of the 
possibility of being ‘duped’ into signing complex contracts that they do not fully 
understand (and knowing that the law does not protect them well against such 
happenings), many individuals and nations have taken the precaution of not getting into 
deals with savvy business partners
23. Hence, the lack of legal or norms-based protection
24 
against such possibilities leads to under-contracting and, consequent inefficiencies
25. 
                                                 
22 See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/02/predlending.htm.   
23 Some years ago in Vietnam I was told by a government official that they hesitate to cut deals with multi-
nationals not because of any inherent aversion to this but for fear that they will not understand complex   26
Moving on further, observe that even if people were fully rational and there were 
no problems of information, the global market place would continue to look very 
different from what textbooks of economics suggest. The reason is the absence of the rule 
of law and the virtual non-existence of global governance. In much of traditional 
thinking, especially among those committed to market fundamentalism, governments and 
markets have been conceptualized as countervailing forces. The advice was always that if 
you want markets to function properly, governments need to withdraw. Here and in his 
earlier writings, Stiglitz rejects this proposition (see, for instance, Stiglitz, 1989). Good 
governance, he argues, is a prerequisite of effective markets. As Soros (2002, p.6) 
observes, “Markets are designed to facilitate the free exchange of goods and services … 
but they are not capable, on their own, of taking care of collective needs such as law and 
order or the maintenance of the market mechanism itself (my italics).”  
Stiglitz argues that on the economic front the world has become interconnected 
with global markets and money flows; yet global political institutions remain woefully 
inadequate.
26 This disillusionment with global political economy can easily translate into 
a blind mistrust of markets and globalization. The protestors in the streets of Seattle 
during the ministerial meeting of WTO and protestors elsewhere at various global 
meetings since Seattle, while rightly upset about the unfairness of the global marketplace, 
                                                                                                                                                 
contracting as well as multi-nationals do and so they may end up signing contracts, unwittingly, that are 
detrimental to themselves. 
24 In Basu (2000), I argue that the law and social norms can in many situations work as equally effective 
substitutes. 
25 Before moving on I should emphasize it is not the rejection of the rationality assumption I am arguing 
for. The assumption has been behind a lot of the success of economics and is very helpful in understanding 
‘normal’ economics. The fault lies in the fact that many economists forget this and take it to domains where 
its fallibility makes a fundamental difference. This also explains why the new political economy, predicated 
on the rational actor model, has not met with greater success. I discuss this at length in Basu (2000). 
26 The same sentiment is echoed by Soros (2002, p.9), “While markets have become global, politics remain 
firmly rooted in the sovereignty for the state.” This idea is elaborated upon in Basu (2002).   27
have been often blinded by emotion and played into the hands of the very people and 
groups that they were protesting against.
27 
What is really excellent about this book is that on this main issue Stiglitz manages 
to have his feet firmly planted on the ground. He makes it amply clear that the potential 
benefits of globalization are large and that markets and incentives are crucial for the 
effective running of a modern economy. Our objective should not be to blunt these 
instruments but to make them work. 
So much of the existing popular literature on globalization is so trite because it is 
based on a critical misunderstanding; it treats globalization as a detachable part of the 
economy. As if it is something that we can have or we can reject. In reality globalization 
is a bit like gravity. We may discuss endlessly whether it is good or bad but the question 
of not having it does not seriously arise. We have to live with it, just as we have to live 
with gravity (at least in the foreseeable future) no matter what our finer emotions about it 
are. Not being a detachable part it is very difficult to evaluate it, since the counter-factual 
of a world like the one we have today but without globalization is difficult to imagine. 
If we want to make globalization work in our collective interest (and not alienate 
large sections of the world, as it has done), what should we do? True, there are not too 
many answers in this book, but what he does very well is to remind us not to be lulled 
                                                 
27 A classic example of this is the argument for the use of a “social clause” by the WTO to uphold 
international labor standards (see Bhagwati, 1995). Many protectionist lobbies in industrialized nations 
favor such a clause (as an instrument to block imports from developing nations), and have nicely managed 
to mingle behind the banners of well-meaning protestors demanding such a provision in the WTO in the 
genuine interest of workers in developing countries. Exactly what form the international labor standards 
requirement will take is a matter of detailed legal and political work and can have very different effects 
depending on how exactly the provisions are drafted. Since the protesters are usually absent in the crafting 
of the fine print and the lobbies are usually present, the broad agenda won with the protesters can be 
converted into a fine print that helps the lobbies instead of the workers.   28
into believing that all is fair in the marketplace, a point of view that the beneficiaries of 
the current global economy are eager to promote.  
That is not all. He makes another suggestion, briefly, but one that can have far-
reaching consequences. He argues for a greater democratization of international 
organizations, so that they become more effective guardians of the interests of the poor 
nations. Similar arguments have been made by others before (see, for instance, Nayyar, 
2003) but coming from Stiglitz, who has been involved with the organizations he seeks to 
reform, this becomes very compelling. He points out how the United States, Europe and 
Japan have dominated decisions in the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO, and how it is 
time to rethink the structure of voting rights in these organizations.
28   
At one level it may seem right that the ones who contribute more money to these 
organizations should have more say. But given that we do not think along such lines 
when we talk of intra-national democracy—no one argues that Bill Gates should have 
more votes than others since he pays more taxes—shows that our notions of global 
democracy remain quite rudimentary. It is therefore quite radical of Stiglitz to suggest a 
greater equity in voting rights even in international organizations. He in fact goes to the 
point of arguing that the rights should not be confined to government ministers, but 
should, presumably, reflect grassroots opinion as well.  
  One cannot jump to conclusions on this, since governance needs expertise and, 
trying to accommodate too many voices can hurt the quality of the decision. On the other 
hand, the current structure of decision-making, makes it possible for few powerful 
                                                 
28 The WTO runs on the principle of one country one vote, but the fixing of agenda behind the scenes—the 
so-called ‘green room effect’--has tended to concentrate power in the hands of the industrialized nations 
with a few developing nations, such as India and now China, having some marginal say (Schott, 2000;   29
interests to hijack the agenda. Moreover, our understanding of the needs of the poor 
nations itself can improve if the poor nations are given greater voice.
29  What one can 
minimally say is that this is a matter that needs to be debated, and not kept away from the 
public eye in a conspiracy of silence, as is currently done. Hence, Stiglitz’s effort at 
bringing this to public scrutiny is laudable. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  This is a hard book to sum up. It cannot be described as a great book, certainly not 
by the yardstick of Stiglitz’s own earlier papers and books. It brings us to the brink of 
analytically interesting and novel ideas but stops before breaking new ground. As prose it 
falls short because it is written too much in the form of streams of consciousness. It 
would have been nice if the material, rich as it is, were better organized.  
But, at the same time, I believe this is an important book, one of the most 
important that I have read in recent times, and one that must be read by anyone interested 
in global politics and human well-being, whether one is planning a career in international 
bureaucracy or to take to the streets. It is a morally courageous books, one in which the 
author does not flinch from taking on the powerful and the established. It is a book that 
could have been written only by an ‘embedded academic’, who has been involved in 
global policy making, is an acute observer and is irreverent enough to write down what 
he saw.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Basu, 2002). Some of the poorest nations of the world, such as sub-Saharan African countries, surely 
deserve more say than they currently have.   
29 This is what Sen (1999) refers to as the “constructive” role of democracy. His discussion is in the context 
of individual needs in national decision-making. But it clearly carries over to inter-country decision 
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